Part III: Social Unrest
A RAND testimony published in 2005 reported that China had seen a dramatic rise in the number of “mass incidents” from 8,700 in 1993 to over 86,000 in 2005. A ten-fold rise in 12 years outpaces the economic boom, and further research conducted at the University of Chicago has separated these incidents from being strictly economic in nature.
Additional factors thought to be attributing to China’s rise in civil unrest include the burgeoning legal system, environmental issues, and land management rights. The use of litigation and public courts is a noteworthy trend in China’s evolving system of governance. As the nation’s legal system garners strength and legitimacy amongst the population, grievances will have a forum capable of hearing and taking action. This has an empowering effect on the mindset of the greater public, and could be an underlying cause for rising demonstrations.
The social costs of lackluster environmental policy are also beginning to be realized in the form of organized dissent. As communities mobilize to effect planned development projects around the country, the cry out for issues such as dwindling potable water, clean-air, and toxicity levels from industrial operations. This kind of informed dissent may be linked to increased awareness of environmental impact issues, and online information sources.
Closely related to this are groups of people voicing their frustration over the lack of land management rights that is afforded to most Chinese citizens. As land is generally held on 3 year lease agreements, few Chinese have ownership and rights over the land their abodes are constructed on. Rising affluence in many sectors of Chinese society has resulted in the desire to own land and control its future. Long seen as a source of influenced decision making by regional governance, Land management and private property rights has also become a hot point.
There are a number of factors adding to the reported increasing levels of social unrest in the People’s Republic of China. However, it is important to take these reports in the proper scope. While the number of public protests may be high, China’s population is huge and the official definition of a public protest can be as small as 3 people gathered. Also, while issues like the growing wealth gap continue to be hotly debated, it is important to note that long term effects of China’s economic development plan have yet to play out, and as many as 50 million people are pulled out of poverty every year in the PRC. There are very big changes happening in China in a very short amount of time, and while this change may not be without fault, with much change comes peripheral unease.
Showing posts with label RAND. Show all posts
Showing posts with label RAND. Show all posts
Saturday, July 26, 2008
Sunday, July 6, 2008
China Trend Analysis I : Military Development in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
Part I: Popular United States views of China’s Military
As the largest military force in the modern world, the United States keeps a wary eye on the quickly developing military & defense agenda of the PRC. Thus, the first part of our investigation into the apparent trends in China’s growing military power will rely heavily on U.S.-led studies into the pace, alignment, and focus of said growth. This article will present a summary of a number of opinions and forecasts as drawn from the U.S. Congress, the RAND Corporation, U.S. National Security Agency documents, among others.
China’s military development over the past 15 years has been as rapid and determined as its economic growth. In fact, the expanded military budget of the PRC closely follows the same trend curve as the nation’s rising GDP index. Though many of the actual figures surrounding defense spending in the PRC are not realized, the data under analysis is based on inferred costs and known purchases by the PRC. From the early 1990’s onwards, the PRC has recorded an annual overall economic growth of approximately 10%. During the same years, military spending has also increased by 10% per year, and stands at around $USD 140 billion for the year of 2008.
These distinctly paralleled figures lead to a number of questions concerning the course that China will follow during in the coming years. Firstly, what will the response be in defensive budgeting due to any abnormalities in economic growth by the PRC? Secondly, to what extent is the military power being amassed by the PRC intended to protect its economic growth trend, and to what means will that protection extend itself? Thirdly, to what degrees is the economic growth contingent on the sphere of military influence the PRC is able to exert?
In answer to the first question, expert opinion in the United States of America seems to revolve around the idea that any divergences in economic growth will result in system wide changes, inclusive of military budgeting. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, an analysis prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the U.S. Congress, states that other economic pressures may play a role in the continued funding for China’s military development. These factors include aging population trends, urbanization of the populous, health-care costs and social welfare programs, and under performing bank loans.
This publication also begins to address the PRC military development strategies in regards to resource allocation. It further offers analysis of official policy concerning the deployment and use of military strength to secure China’s national interests. As the world’s largest consumer of grain, coal, steel, and meat, and second only to the United States in oil consumption, China has on of the most robust and diverse economies of the world. Secure shipping lanes, access to natural resources, and peaceful relations with neighboring nations are among the top priorities to military policy makers. These factors have guided the development of strategic bases across from Taiwan, the building of a modern naval power to police the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea, and continual territorial negotiations with India, Bhutan, and other nations.
In address to the last of these questions, U.S. analysts generally conclude that China is still a growing military power, though a quickly advancing one. As a result of this status, it is generally perceived that China’s military has yet to reach the capacity necessary to carry out long-term military engagements from a distance. However, as China fortifies its ability to protect its territorial claims, and secure its geographic position against outside influence, it has recently begun embarking on a number of technological acquisitions enabling long range engagements. Its push to “informatize” its military policy includes strategies aimed at causing disjunction in the logistics, communications, and other vital networks to opposing forces.
To better understand these assessments please refer to the
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008,
Forecasting China’s Military Spending through 2025, and
Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense.
As the largest military force in the modern world, the United States keeps a wary eye on the quickly developing military & defense agenda of the PRC. Thus, the first part of our investigation into the apparent trends in China’s growing military power will rely heavily on U.S.-led studies into the pace, alignment, and focus of said growth. This article will present a summary of a number of opinions and forecasts as drawn from the U.S. Congress, the RAND Corporation, U.S. National Security Agency documents, among others.
China’s military development over the past 15 years has been as rapid and determined as its economic growth. In fact, the expanded military budget of the PRC closely follows the same trend curve as the nation’s rising GDP index. Though many of the actual figures surrounding defense spending in the PRC are not realized, the data under analysis is based on inferred costs and known purchases by the PRC. From the early 1990’s onwards, the PRC has recorded an annual overall economic growth of approximately 10%. During the same years, military spending has also increased by 10% per year, and stands at around $USD 140 billion for the year of 2008.
These distinctly paralleled figures lead to a number of questions concerning the course that China will follow during in the coming years. Firstly, what will the response be in defensive budgeting due to any abnormalities in economic growth by the PRC? Secondly, to what extent is the military power being amassed by the PRC intended to protect its economic growth trend, and to what means will that protection extend itself? Thirdly, to what degrees is the economic growth contingent on the sphere of military influence the PRC is able to exert?
In answer to the first question, expert opinion in the United States of America seems to revolve around the idea that any divergences in economic growth will result in system wide changes, inclusive of military budgeting. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, an analysis prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the U.S. Congress, states that other economic pressures may play a role in the continued funding for China’s military development. These factors include aging population trends, urbanization of the populous, health-care costs and social welfare programs, and under performing bank loans.
This publication also begins to address the PRC military development strategies in regards to resource allocation. It further offers analysis of official policy concerning the deployment and use of military strength to secure China’s national interests. As the world’s largest consumer of grain, coal, steel, and meat, and second only to the United States in oil consumption, China has on of the most robust and diverse economies of the world. Secure shipping lanes, access to natural resources, and peaceful relations with neighboring nations are among the top priorities to military policy makers. These factors have guided the development of strategic bases across from Taiwan, the building of a modern naval power to police the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea, and continual territorial negotiations with India, Bhutan, and other nations.
In address to the last of these questions, U.S. analysts generally conclude that China is still a growing military power, though a quickly advancing one. As a result of this status, it is generally perceived that China’s military has yet to reach the capacity necessary to carry out long-term military engagements from a distance. However, as China fortifies its ability to protect its territorial claims, and secure its geographic position against outside influence, it has recently begun embarking on a number of technological acquisitions enabling long range engagements. Its push to “informatize” its military policy includes strategies aimed at causing disjunction in the logistics, communications, and other vital networks to opposing forces.
To better understand these assessments please refer to the
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008,
Forecasting China’s Military Spending through 2025, and
Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense.
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